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UNION OF LAW AND EQUITY AND TRIAL BY JURY UNDER THE CODES
It is an interesting speculation whether an able court does not tend
naturally because of its own high level of efficiency to require of others
a greater facility in matters of procedure than may reasonably or prac-
tically be expected. The New York ,Court of Appeals now furnishes
an occasion for such a speculation. That able tribunal has recently gone
far to reEstablish the requirement that the pleader must have and stick
to one theory of his cause of action.- It has stated, in reversing a judg-
ment because of lack of a jury trial, that "the inherent and fundamental
difference between actions at law and suits in equity cannot be ignored,"
coupling with this some encomiums upon the necessity of exact pleading
which have a distinctly antiquarian sound.2  Still more recently it has
expressed "a desire to preserve to litigants the forms of procedure pre-
scribed by law and the rights flowing therefrom." 3 It has made doubt-
ful the former New York law that a plaintiff who sued for specific
performance knowing that he could get only damages, could nevertheless
get the latter,4 for it states that the weight of authority is that "the court
will not retain the action and grant purely legal relief, but will dismiss
the complaint."5 And it has now just held in Syracus.e v. Hogan
'Walrath v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. (1915) 216 N. Y. 220, n1o N. E. 426; see
also the case in note 3, infra. See criticism of the requirement of a theory of the
pleading and discussion of the former New York rule in Albertsworth, The Theory
of the Pleadings in Code States (1922) 10 CALIF. L. REtV. 202; Whittier, The
Theory of a Pleading (19o8) 8 CoL. L. REv. 523; (1911) 24 HARV. L. REv. 480;
(1918) 32 HARV. L. REV. 66.
'Jackson v. Strong (1917) 222 N. Y. 149, 18 N. E. 512. This was brought as an
action for an accounting between partners but turned out to be merely an action
for breach of contract. For criticism of the case, see NOTES (1918) 32 H-Av. L.
Rtv. 166; Scott, Progress of the Law (11) 33 HARV. L. REv. 236, 240; Alberts-
worth, op. cit. supra note I. In the NoTE first cited it is said that inasmuch as the
defendant admitted his breach of contract there was no question of fact at issue.
It seems, however, that the defendant should be entitled to a jury trial on the issue
of damages. In any event the court did not show itself astute to discover a waiver
of the defendant's right to trial by jury through his failure to assert it seasonably.
'Merry Realty Co. v. Shamokin & Hollis R. E. Co. (1921) 230 N. Y. 316, 13o
N. E. 3o6 (reversing 186 App. Div. 538), action to foreclose a mortgage given on
exchange of real property; counterclaim for rescission of the exchange, return of
the defendant's realty and damages; on the plaintiff's appeal, judgment for the
defendant for money damages for deceit was held error as inconsistent with the
theory of the pleadings; the pleadings were for equitable relief, the judgment was
for legal relief; all the courts who heard the case were convinced of the plaintiff's
gross fraud and deception; justice seems to have been done; and yet a new trial
is necessary to allow full damages only if rescission cannot be had, since the
action is equitable.
'Barlow v. Scott (i861) 24 N. Y. 40.
Jackson v. Strong, szapra note 2. Apparently, however, the court will not go
so far as to dismiss the complaint. In Saperstein v. Mechanics & Farinwrs' Bank
(1920) 228 N. Y. 257, 126 N. E. 708, the court says that if in addition to an
equitable cause of action "the facts as stated give rise to a legal liability then
there should be no dismissal; the action remains to be tried." There is a quite
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(1923) 234 N. Y. 457,8 that in a suit to enjoin one from maintaining a
building and other encroachments on a strip of land, title to which was
claimed by the plaintiff, the defendant who claimed title in himself by
adverse possession is entitled as of right to a trial by jury. Judge
Cardozo dissented in an able opinion, in which judges Pound and Crane
concurred.
It is submitted that in this series of cases the learned court has
approached the problem of the union of equity and law under the codes
from a fundamentally unsound standpoint. It ought not to be true that
actions at law and suits in equity must be considered still inherently
different. It would be a disgrace to our law if the ancient cumbersome
methods of doing justice by two separate systems of law were still neces-
sary. And the experience of enlightened states, such as Connecticut,
shows that it is not necessary. The difficulty is the same as that dis-
cussed in Professor Cook's article earlier herein, 7 namely, the failure to
appreciate that equity and law were not two concurrent systems of law
but were to a large extent two conflicting systems and that the purpose
of the makers of the code seems dearly to have been to end such con-
flict by providing for one system of justice. This system cannot be
called either legal or equitable as these terms were anciently used. It
is a combination of the two, wherein the substantive jural relation
enforced by the court in the first instance is the same as would ultimately
have been preserved under the old system by a roundabout method of a
proceeding in equity to prevent its non-enforcement at law. 8
A large part of the confusion is undoubtedly due to the fact that the
state constitutions preserve inviolate the constitutional right of trial by
jury as existing at the time of their adoption. This adds to the incon-
venience of trial but should do no more. The jury does not determine
the method of procedure except in one part thereof, namely, the ascer-
tainment of the facts. Other parts of a lawsuit, such as the framing
of issues, and proceedings after judgment, may proceed in substantially
the same manner whether a jury trial is had or not.9 Hence the right to a
surprising amount of confusion generally on this point. See ig L. R. A.
(N. s.) 1064, 1075, note. See NoTEs (1916) i6 CoL. L. REv. 326. In the Saper-
stein case the action is said to be "now an action at law"; in McGraw Co. v.
Zanta Tire & Rubber Co. (1922, Iowa) igo N. W. I29, the remedy is said to be
by motion to transfer to the "law calendar"; in Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Walker
(1923, Wash.) 212 Pac. 277, "there came into being by the pleadings of the
parties .... a simple law action" in what had been an action for equitable relief,
or else the defendant lost his right to trial by jury. The continued use of the
term "law" is unfortunate as tending to perpetuate a distinction which no longer
exists.
Reversing (1922) :2o App. Div. 874.
'Cook, Equitable Defenses (1923) 32 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 645.
'See discussion, ibid.
'Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon (1923, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. ii8, discussed by Cook,
op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 656, illustrates a not uncommon distinction still preserved
between equitable and legal causes, namely that the appellate court may review the
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jury trial should mean merely that after the issues have been formed they
should, upon motion of any party, be examined to determine whether,
at the time of the adoption of the constitution, under such issues the
facts had to be ascertained by a jury. Since court and jury trials were
kept separate by the existence of separate tribunals until the adoption
of the codes, our question is substantially therefore an historical one
as to the situation which existed at the time of adoption of the codes.-1
Moreover, the parties should be held to have waived the raising of the
question and their constitutional right by not asserting it seasonably.'"
In the principal case, therefore, where the right was asserted in due
fashion, the question is really whether equity would have tried a disputed
title to land, before the amalgamation of equity and law. The majority
try to dismiss the question more summarily by asserting that the case
comes within the terms of the code action of ejectment where the parties
by the code are entitled to a jury trial, and it is claimed that the plain-
tiff may be given complete relief therein by an award, provided for in
the code, of damages and expenses for removing encroachments?
2
The argument seems to be that although you have tried to bring an
action for "equitable" relief, yet since "legal" relief is sufficient, we
will compress your action into one for "legal" relief. But as Judge
Cardozo clearly demonstrates, the plaintiff in such a case should be given
an injunction compelling the defendant to remove the encroachment or
else the sheriff, acting for the plaintiff, is put in the position of Shylock
limited exactly to his pound of flesh. The better rule, already followed
in New York, gives the owner "the remedy that will place the risk and
the cost upon the shoulders of the wrongdoer."'1 3  Hence the plaintiff
should be held entitled to "equitable" relief.
Now there is a rule of some vogue that equity will not try a disputed
title to realty but will await a decision at law before awarding permanent
facts in the former but not in the latter cases. This is not a necessary rule.
Under the Connecticut procedure findings by court or jury are equally respected.
See Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Miller (i913) 88 Conn. 157, 90 Atl. 228
(action of interpleader).
" See the admirable Connecticut provision quoted by Cook, op. cit. supra note 7,
at p. 652. The method there set forth was applied in Roy v. Moore (1912) 85
Conn. I59, 82 Atl. 233, a case similar to the principal case.
I Here again the Connecticut provisions seem admirable. In effect they require
a party affirmatively to ask for a jury trial within a certain time or the right is
waived. Conn. Gen. Sts. igi8, sec. 5752. The cumbersome New York provisions
referred to by Cook, op. cit. supra note 7, at' p. 651, require a~firinative action in
order to waive the right. The Connecticut provision is constitutional. Noren v.
Wood (1899) 72 Conn. 96, 43 Atl. 649.
'Code Civ. Proc. sec. 3343, subd. 20; sec. 968, subd. 2; sec. 1496, 1497; sec.
166o-i662; sec. I24o; N. Y. C. P. A. 1920, sec. 7, subd. 8; sec. 425, subd. 2; sec.
920, 504, 505.
"Cardozo, J., dissenting in the principal case; Hahl v. Sugo (igoi) 169 N. Y.
1o9, 62 N. E. 135; City of New York v. Rice (191o) ig N. Y. 124, gi N. E. 283.
See discussion by Professor G. E. Woodbine in COMMENTS (917) 27 YALR LAW
JOURNAL, 265.
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relief. Some courts have thought the rule to be jurisdictional,14 but
equity scholars seem in the main to view it only as a rule of policy,
not of power.' 5 Even so, if the equity court did not actually and in
practice try the title, the defendant now should have his jury trial on
this issue only and such has been the result sometimes reached under
the codes. 6 In some states, however, the entire rule had been repudi-
ated,17 and this, so says Judge Cardozo, was the situation in New York.
The cases seem to bear him out, even though in certain of them the
judges enter a caveat as though they were not entirely sure of their
ground.'8  Nevertheless, there seems to have been clearly sufficient
basis so that a decision refusing a jury trial, a result desirable as avoid-
ing an expensive and inefficient procedure, could not have been con-
sidered as any vital attack upon the ark of the constitution.
Judge Cardozo says: "We have left far in the distance the wasteful
duplication of remedies and trials. We shall set the clock back many
years if we return to it to-day." Perhaps he overstates the case: for
if the jury is to be considered only as one of several bodies available
for determining the facts, as it is, and not as a kind of central pivot
about which the whole case revolves, the only result is to require the
use of this particular body as the fact-finding machinery in this case.'"
"
4Hernann v. Mexican Petrolemn Corp. (1915) 85 N. J. Eq. 367, 96 Atl. 492;
Freer v. Davis (19o3) 52 W. Va. I, 43 S. E. 164.
15 1 Ames, Cases in Equity iurisprude;we (19o3) 515; 5 Pomeroy, Equity Ituris-
prudence (2d ed. 1919) 4355, 4356, and cases cited. The entire equitable rule has
been subjected to severe criticism. See William Draper Lewis, Injunctions
Against Nuisances and the Ride Requiring the Plabiiff to Establish his Right at
Law (19o8) 56 U. PA. L. REv. 289; Clark, Equity (1920) sec. 193.
"sSo in Roy v. Moore, snpra note IO, the court found that in Connecticut, on
January I, i88o, the equity court would not have tried the title and hence it
properly concludes that the parties have rights to jury trials. Cases from other
jurisdictions are therein cited.
"Lux v. Haggin (1886) 69 Calif. 255, 284, IO Pac. 674; cf. Ladd v. Osborne
(189o) 79 Iowa, 93, 44 N. W. 245; Pohlnan v. Evangelical Lutheran Trinity
Church (I9OO) 6o Neb. 364, 83 N. W. 2o1; Williams v. Riley (907) 79 Neb. 554,
113 X. 'V. 186. See Lewis, op. oat. spra note 15, at p. 315, upon the rule in
nuisance cases: "But, though we may observe that the rule is dying, it is unfortu-
nately not yet a corpse; and the difficulty is that no lawyer knows when it will be
galvanized into sufficieit life to delay and vex his client's pursuits of justice." In
some jurisdictions the rule is overthrown by statute or rule of court. See Lord
Hale's Act (1862) 25 & :26 Vict. c. 42; Federal Equity Rule No. 23, 226 U. S.
App'x. 6, 33 Sup. Ct. xxiv; cf. Carpenter v. Dennison (1919) 208 Mich. 441, 175
Y . W. 419.
18 See cases cited by Cardozo, J., dissenting, including Hahl v. Sugo, supra note
13; Baron v. Korn (1891) 127 N. Y. 224, 27 N. E. 804; Hinckel v. Stevens
(1897) 17 App. Div. 279, 45 N. Y. Supp. 678, (igoo) 165 -N. Y. I71, 58 N. E. 879;
Olmsted v. Loomis (1854) 9 N. Y. 423. See also Belkuzp v. Trimble (1832,
N. Y.) 3 Paige Ch. 577; Kent, Ch., in Gardner v. Newburgh (1816, N. Y.) 2
Johns. Ch. 162.
"Historically the jury developed as only one of several methods of finding the
facts. In earlier times the court determined the method of trial, whether by ordeal,
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Nevertheless, the decision is unfortunate. Jurists of experience findlittle to say in support of the delays, the expense, and the aleatory results
of trial by jury.20 In England it is being more and more restricted.21
Its real advantage seems to be as a kind of safety valve for the judicial
system. It relieves the judges of the burden and the odium of deciding
close questions of fact in cases, such as personal injury actions, where
the feelings of litigants are apt to run high. Surely it is a loss to extend
the field of its application by the application of the constitutional strait-jacket where not necessary.
C. E. C.
C. I. F. CONTRACTS IN AMERICAN LAW, I
That familiarity which breeds contempt has some points of advantage
over the unfamiliarity which breeds confusion. Until quite recently
c. i. f. contracts have been regarded as "British contracts,"' and left for
full discussion to the British writers.2 But the overseas trade which
compurgation, battle, and so on. Since the jury became increasingly popular tolitigants, the judges of the king's courts saw their opportunity to extend the popu-larity of those courts and increase the king's revenues by making use of this newfact-finding machinery. It is a later development which gave to the jury the
unique position it so long occupied in English law. See Bigelow, History ofProcedure (I88O) "The Medial Judgment," 288 et seq.; Thayer, Preliminary
Treatise on Evidence (1898) chs. I &: 2.
"Judge J. C. McWhorter, Abolish the Jury (1923) 29 W. VA. L. QuAR. 97;
Ex-Senator and Judge John D. Works, Juridical Reform (1919) 50.
"In England, by the Administration of Justice Act, 192o, in any action except
libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction, breach ofpromise of marriage, and certain matrimonial and probate cases, where the court
or judge upon application of a party is "satisfied" that "the action or matter can-
not as conveniently be tried with a jury as without," he shall have power "notwith-
standing anything in any Act," to order it tried without a jury. (192o) io & II
Geo. V, c. 81, sec. 2; Annual Practice (1923) 2155; Order 36, rules 2-6, AnnualPractice, (1923) 58o-585. This procedure has been objected to by the judges of
the Court of Appeal in Ford v. Blurton (1922) 38 T. L. R. 8oi, and in various
notes in (1922) 153 LAW TImEs, 196; (1922) 154 ibid. 37; (1923) 155 ibid. 45,
227, but it seems not undesirable.
See Williston, Sales (19o9) 408; II C. J. 765; (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL,go. Recently the subject has been receiving attention. Williston, The Progress
of the Law 199-592o, Sales (1921) 34 HARv. L. REV. 741, 75o et seq.; Lucas,Liability uder C. I. F. Contracts (1921) 41 CAN. L. T. 556; Craighill, Sales ofGoods on C. I. F. Terms (1919) 6 VA. L. REv. 229; (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 724;
(1922) 22 ibid. 6oi; (1920) 20 ibid. Io1; io A. L. R. 7Ol, note; 2o A. L. R. 1236,
note; 7 B. R. C. 956.
- Not that the references in the British writers can always be counted on for
help. See Benjamin, Sales (6th ed. 1920) 8o8 et seq.; Blackburn, Contract ofSale (3d Canadian ed. 191o) 241, note; although there is scattered through each
of these books a great quantity of uncorrelated material on the subject See also
25 Hals. Laws Eng. 211. But Chalmers, Sale of Goods Act (8th ed. 1920) 86-88,
contains an excellent brief discussion; so also Scrutton, Charter Parties (8th ed.
1917) 166-7.
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developed with 1914 of necessity led to wider introduction into American
business of the c. i. f. terms of sale, along with branch banking, com-
mercial letters of credit, an acceptance market, and the machinery of
British foreign trade generally. With the price decline of 192o began
the litigation which will some day make clear the legal status of these
useful, though still rather unfamiliar institutions. The somewhat con-
fused opinion recently handed down in Arctic Ice & Coal Co. v. South-
gate3 challenges thought on the close relation of c. i. f. terms to the
commercial letter of credit, and presents again the question: at what
point, under c. i. f. terms, does the seller acquire the right to immediate
payment of the purchase price? The first of these problems perhaps
leads too far afield for more than incidental discussion here; the second
is both timely and interesting. In the case referred to it seems to have
been held that the right to the price accrued, despite the buyer's refusal
to take delivery, on presentment by the seller of a draft accompanied by
the requisite documents, a conclusion in line with the weight and sounder
current of authority.5
The letters c. i. f. mean "cost, insurance, freight," and in the classic
language of Blackburn, J.: "The terms at a price, 'to cover cost, freight,
and insurance, payment by acceptance [or cash] on receiving shipping
documents,' are very usual, and are perfectly well understood in practice.
The invoice is made out debiting the consignee [or buyer, where the bill
of lading runs to seller's order] with the agreed price . . . . and giving
him credit for the amount of the freight which he will have to pay to
the shipowner on actual delivery, and for the balance a draft is drawn
on the consignee [buyer] which he is bound to accept [or pay] (if the
shipment [or documents?] be in conformity with his contract), on
'(Feb. 9, 1923) U. S. C. C. A. 4th, Oct. term, 1922, No. 368.
'As far as appears, the action may have been either for non-acceptance or for
the price, the facts being such as to make no difference in the amount of recovery,
as the goods had been promptly realized at the market; the reasoning indicates an
action for the price. A vigorous dissent was filed to so much of the opinion as
held the buyer's bank, which had procured a credit to be opened "under our guaran-
tee," not to be liable. This holding turned partly on whether a credit good against
"shipping documents" is satisfied by presentment of a delivery order, partly on
how far the terms of the underlying sales contract are read into ambiguous
language in a letter of credit, and partly on the effect of a bank "guaranty" of
indemnity as curing non-conformance of the documents tendered under a credit
The opinion is also notable as implying the possibility of suit by the beneficiary of
the credit directly against the original bank which "opens" the credit "through"
another bank (the latter apparently acting in its own name) ; and for citing no
authority at all.
The case does not present a strictly standard c. i. f. contract, as will appear
below, since the quotation c. i. f. was modified by "ex dock New York, duty paid,"
and "seller's obligation as to delivery complete upon 'presentation of shipping docu-
ments," and "payable . . . . on presentation of dock receipt or bill of lading,"
this last being subsequently changed to "delivery order."
'Clenwns Horst Co. v. Biddell Bros. [1912, H. L.] A. C. 18; cases cited io
A. L. R. 701, note; Scrutton, op. cit. supra note 2.
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having handed to him the charter-party, bill of lading, and a policy of
insurance. Should the ship arrive with the goods on board he will have
to pay the freight, which will make up the amount he has engaged to
pay. Should the goods not be delivered in consequence of a peril of
the sea, he is not called on to pay the freight, and he will recover the
amount of his interest under the policy. If the non-delivery is in con-
sequence of some misconduct on the part of the master or mariners, not
covered by the policy, he will recover it from the shipowner. In sub-
stance, therefore, the consignee [buyer] pays, though in a different
manner, the same price as if the goods had been bought and shipped in
the ordinary way."6  "Thus, the purchaser deals with the matter in
gross, and not in detail, transacts the various branches of the business
with one person instead of three, fixes his liability at a lump sum, and
in case of loss will recover the amount of his interest under the policy."7
Thus, then, these terms serve the convenience of the buyer, relieving
him of the burden of making arrangements; and, like f. o. b., f. a. s.,
c. & f., apportion between buyer and seller the outlay for incidental
charges; and, finally, throw on the seller the risk or profit from fluctua-
tion in freight or insurance rates between the closing of the contract for
sale and the contracts for carriage and cover.
But, despite spasmodic indications to the contrary,8 the c. i. f. terms
do more. They are working out-in England, indeed, they have
already worked out-into a fairly definite standardized form of contract
covering not only the amount of the price, but the time and place of
payment, the risk of damage, the risk of loss, the absence of a condition
of opportunity to inspect, and similar matters0 ; a standardized form
which is, however, like most such forms, subject to modification in any
particulars by parties who so express themselves. In regard to this
form there has been in the last few years a harvest of decisions, not only
here but in England. A convenient approach to the cases is to consider
successively the amount of payment, the time of payment, the place of
payment, the seller's breach and the measures of damages, and-a more
'Ireland v. Livingston (1872) L. R- 5 H. L. 395, 406. The square brackets are
the writer's, and indicate the more obvious qualifications and extensions necessary.
'Mee v..McNider (1888) lO9 N. Y. 500, 17 N. E. 424.
'Collignon & Co. v. Hammond Milling Co. (1912) 68 Wash. 626, 123 Pac.
1O83, limiting the c. i. f. quotation to price definition and stating that "an offer and
acceptance on that basis, therefore, does not, more than in other sales, determine
as between buyer and seller when or where the title passes, . . . . is, if read
literally, not supported by the authorities and has, in fact, been overruled by our
decision in Andersen, Meyer & Co. v. Northwest Trading Co. (1921) 115 Wash.
37, 196 Pac. 63o." Northern G. W. Co. v. Northwest Trading'Co. (1921) 117
Wash. 422, 2Ol Pac. 9o3, 204 Pac. 202. "The term appears in the clause of the
contract relating to price, and has, therefore, very little bearing upon the question
of the place of delivery." Schopflocher v. Essgee Co. of China, Inc. (1921) 197
App. Div. 781, 785, 189 N. Y. Supp. 498; George Carocopos, Inc. v. James Chieves
& Co. (1922) 2o3 App. Div. 1O4, 196 N. Y. Supp. 425, 428.
* F. 0. B. and C. 0. D. shipments are undergoing a similar process.
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intricate problem-the documentary conditions on payment. For it is
in the peculiar features relating to payment that the essence of the
c. i. f. contract is to be found; and especially in the fact that normally
the measure of the conditions on the buyer's duty, like the measure of
his security, is in the documents tendered to him-making the payment
(and right to payment) turn in the ordinary case not on actual per-
formance by the seller of his substantial obligation, but on his providing
papers which are on their face in order.Y°
Amount of payment to seller. Despite general quotation of Black-
burn as an introduction to discussion of c. i. f. contracts, the American
cases tend to disregard his suggestion that freight is to be only arranged,
not paid, by the seller, its amount being allowed as a credit against the
invoice." Sometimes this difference is explicitly noted'
2 ; more often
" This statement represents the actual state of the English authorities, the needs
of the economic situation, and the situation toward which the writer believes the
American authorities to be inevitably developing. Manbre Saccharine Co. v. Corn
Products Co. [1919] i K. B. 198, 2o2: "I conceive that the essential feature of an
ordinary c. i. f. contract as compared with an ordinary contract for the sale of
goods rests in the fact that performance of the bargain is to be fulfilled by delivery
of documents and not by the actual physical delivery of goods by the vendor. All
that the buyer can call for is delivery of the customary documents. This repre-
sents the measure of the buyer's right and the extent of the vendor's duty." It must
be stated, however, that there is a stubborn disposition in many American cases to
stress due delivery of the goods as a, or the, vital condition to payment. Only
when dealing with an issuing bank's obligations under a letter of credit put out on
a buyer's behalf in cover of the buyer's obligation, are the American cases as yet
clear and consistent in looking to the form of the documents as the true condition
on the duty to pay. Mead, Dociomentary Letters of Credit (1922) 22 CoL L. REv.
297; McCurdy, infra note 25. But this is believed to result largely from the fact
that the American cases have not happened to present repeatedly for decision the
situation where payment is demanded purely against documents, before the goods
themselves have arrived. And see Harper v. Hochstin (1921, C. C. A. 2d) 278
Fed. io2: "The buyer can no more refuse the documents and ask for the goods
than can the seller withhold the documents and tender the goods"; the sustaining
of a demurrer to the seller's action for breach was there made to turn on his
failure to tender documents, tender of goods and allegations of readiness to tender
goods being disregarded by the court.' See also Orient Co. v. Brekke & Howlid
[11 I K. B. 531; Scott v. Barclay's Bank (1923, C. A.) 14 Ll. L. L. R. 
89,
142; Chalmers, op. cit. supra note 2; Scrutton, op. cit. supra, note 2. In Dewar
& Webb v. Rank, Ltd. (1923, C. A.) I4 Ll. L. L. R. 393, a c. i. f. contract con-
tained a provision that the bill of lading should be considered proof of the date
of shipment in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Despite a showing that
more bills of lading were issued under date of the last day for shipment than 
there
was grain aboard to correspond, it was held that the buyer in order to sustain his
case must further show the bills of lading tendered to be the ones improperly
issued. Quaere, as to the effect of the evidence, had the stipulation not been in
the contract?
' Blackburn is followed in the dicta in Thames & Mersey Mar. Ins. Co. v.
United States (1915) 237 U. S. 19, 35 Sup. Ct 496, and Staackimn, Horschitz &
Co. v. Cary (1916) 197 Ill. App. 6oi; and again in Groom, Ltd. v. Barber [1915]
i K. B. 316, in England.
' Mee v. McNider, supra note 7.
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it is slurred over, the indication being to the contrary.13 No American
decision squarely on the point has been found. The value of the dis-
tinction appears in considering the point of time at which the strain hits
the buyer's pocket. Where the terms are cash against documents,
Blackburn's rule will normally work to the buyer's advantage by post-
poning the payment of that portion of the price; where, on the other
hand, documents are delivered against acceptance, the freight may have
to be paid before the acceptance falls due.
The payment of any import duties would under ordinary c. i. f. terms
seem to fall on the buyer, over and above the price ;14 so also any payment
involved in the procurement of export licenses.'15 And if insurance is called
for by the buyer, and arranged by the seller,', outside of what is custo-
mary in the trade and between the ports concerned' 7 it seems clear that
"
3Seaver v. Lindsay Light Co. (1922) 233 N. Y. 273, 135 N. E. 329; Williston,
op. cit. supra note i, at p. 753; cf. Warner, Barnes & Co. v. Warner Sugar R. Co.
(921, Sup. Ct) I7 Misc. 247, 192 N. Y. Supp. 15I; Smith Co. v. Marano (I92O)
267 Pa. lO7, 11o Atl. 94. In Smith Co. v. Moschalades (1920) 193 App. Div. 126,
129, 183 N. Y. Supp. 5oo, quoted with approval in Andersen, Meyer & Co. v.
Northwest Trading Co., supra note 8, the language is carefully made broad enough
to cover either procedure. The uncertainty on the point is beautifully illustrated
in Klipstein & Co. v. Dilsizian (1921, C. C. A. 2d) 273 Fed. 473: "Under such a
contract, the seller must ship the goods, arrange the contract of affreightment to
the place of destination, pay its cost and allow it from the purchase price."
14 See American Com. Co. v. Fredk. -Boehm, Ltd. (igig, K. B.) 35 T. L. R. 224;
George Carocopos, Inc. v. James Chieves & Co., supra note 8; see Lorimer v.
Slade (1905) 5 N. S. W. 71. Even under the terms "duty paid," increase of
duty between contracting and importing is recoverable by the seller under the
British Finance Act (19Ol) i Edw. VII, c. 7. But our law, having no such
statute, seems to be otherwise. 35 Cyc. lO9.
"Whereas in Brandt & Co. v. Morris & Co. [1917 C. A.] 2 K. B. 784, under an
f. o. b. contract, it was held a condition to buyer's right for non-delivery that he
apply for (and secure) export licenses followed, as to export tax, Krauter v.
Menchacatorre [(1922) 202 App. Div. 2oo, 195 N. Y. Supp. 361], in Anglo-
Russian Mcht. Traders, Ltd. v. John Batt & Co. [1917, C. A.] 2 K. B. 679, the
court considered that under a c. and f. contract a duty to obtain export licenses
lay on the seller, excused only by impossibility due to government regulations.
Whether payments to actual, but bribable, representatives of an unrecognized but
effective government would be within the same rule, is an interesting question.
Cf. Rosenberg v. Internatl. Banking Corp. (1922, K. B.) 13 LI. L. L. R. 12o,
where a banker's lien on bills of lading to secure advances made to a forwarding
agent was sustained, although such advances covered illicit expenses incident on
getting goods out of Russia to avoid danger of confiscation, and though such
charges amounted to half the value.
10 If not called for expressly by the contract, there seems to be no legal duty on
the seller to arrange such insurance, even if requested. Groom, Ltd. v. Barber,
supra note ii, indicating that "war risk for buyer's account" might have the latter
meaning.
"
1 Smith Co. v. Moschalades, supra note 13, holding only evidence of what was
usual in trade in shipping from the port of shipment to be admissible; the price
was held due, though the goods had been lost through uncovered war risk.
Youill v. Scott Robson [igo8, C. A.] i K. B. 270; Groom Ltd. v. Barber, supra
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the expense of such insurance is an addition to the agreed price. Where
the goods were sold c. i. f. to buyer's wharf, it has been held that extra
outlay incident to discharge at another wharf fell on the seller'; but it
seems clear that if non-delivery, or failure to deliver, is due to the
carrier's fault, any expenses involved should fall on the buyer, if the bill
of lading procured and tendered is according to contract.' 9 One last
query may be suggested: if, as occasionally happens, the goods beat the
documents in, and the buyer needs the goods, does any expense, e.g., of
indemnity bond, involved in securing release of the goods properly fall
on the seller ?20
Time of payment. "No one doubts that the seller's breach of a c. i. f.
contract arises on failure to ship, but no one suggests that the buyer's
duty to pay arises on such shipment." 21  That duty to pay awaits tender
of the required documents, and, with such tender, becomes immediate.
22
note ii. A fortiori -will the scope of required insurance not be extended by out-
break of war between contracting and shipment. Law & Bonar, Ltd. v. Br.-Aln.
Tobacco Co. [1916] 2 K B. 605, also holding a printed clause that goods were at
seller's risk until actual delivery to be repugnant to c. i. f. terms; with which cf.
Harper v. Hochstim, supra note IO.
"Acme Wood Flooring Co. v. Sutherland Innes Co. (19o4, C. A.) 9 Com. Cas.
17o. Non-procurement of shipping documents reading to the agreed point of dis-
charge may result not only in extra charges to the seller, and in his failing to
acquire a right to the price, but in his being subjected to damages for non-delivery.
Lecky & Co. v. Ogilvy, Gillanders & Co. (897, C. A.) 3 Com. Cas. 29 (bill of
lading read to Tripoli in Syria instead of to Tripoli in Africa) ; cases note 23,
infra.
, Blackburn, op. cit. supra note 6; see Groom, Ltd. v. Barber, supra note ii;
Scrutton, op. cit. supra note 2.
"It is believed not, if the seller has used reasonable diligence to have the docu-
ments sent forward. See Northern G. W. Co. v. Northwest Trading Co., supra
note 8; cf. Taylor & Co. Ofverberg & Co. (I9230 K. B.) 14 LI. L. L. 7L 131;
Johnson v. Taylor Bros. & Co. [192o, H. L.] A. C. 144, 156. One would expect
the same result as to any demurrage charges not attributable to the seller's default.
'Farwell, L. J., in Biddell.v. Clemens Horst Co. [1911, C. A.] x K. B. 934, 951.
This must be borne in mind in reading those New York cases which overstress the
duty and conditions of proper shipment to the apparent exclusion of all else.
"Only one condition is to be performed, that of shipment . . . ." Mee v. Mc-
Nider, supra note 7. "A simple c. i. f. contract requires the seller to deliver to
the carrier and upon such delivery the obligation is at an end." Willits & Pater-
son v. Abekobei & Co. (1921) 197 App. Div. 528, I89 N. Y. Supp. 525. But these
statements are patently not to be read as they stand: "The seller completes his
contract when he delivers the merchandise called for to the shipper [sic], pays
the freight thereon to point of destination, and forwards to the buyer bill of
lading," etc. Seazer vi. Lindsay Light Co., supra note 13; Harper v. Hochstim,
supra note 1O; Scrutton, op. cit. supra note 2.
' Clemens Horst & Co. v. Biddell Bros., and cases cited supra note 5; Gillespie
Bros. vi. Thompson Bros. & Co. (1922, C. A.) 13 LI. L. L. P- 519; Dewar &
Webb v. Rank, Ltd., supra note Io; Strasbourger v. Leerburger (i921) 195 App.
Div. 481, 186 N. Y. Supp. 797, where, however, the goods seem to have arrived
two days before the documents.
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More-the buyer has a right that the documents be procured and pre-
sented, for non-fulfillment of which an action lies. 2 In the normal
course of events the documents, attached to the seller's draft for the
price,24 come forward by mail well ahead of the goods. Payment in
cash serves to put the seller in funds and the buyer out, without further
operation. If, on the other hand, the buyer accepts the seller's time
draft, this makes it possible for the seller to secure credit in primary
reliance on the buyer, yet with the ever-present contingency of recourse
on himself. But if the acceptance of a proper bank is procured by the
buyer, the seller is put into position to secure funds by way of discount,
with negligible strain on his own credit resources. In any case, the
buyer (subject, it may be, to arrangements with his banker 25) secures
control of the goods for immediate turn-over by selling "to arrive."
Under this course of business it is clear that payment must normally be
made without inspection by the buyer of the actual merchandise, and in
reliance only on the documents 6-an incident which the c. i. f. contract
has in common with every commercial letter of credit transaction, with
the c. & f. sale, and with many f. o. b.. contracts.27  And in the c. i. f.
contract this rule holds, even though the usual clause "cash against
documents," or its equivalent, is not expressed. 28  It is likewise clear
that these terms shift from seller to buyer not only the whole or a goodly
'Lecky & Co. v. Ogilvy, Gillanders & Co., supra note 18; see Johnson v.
Taylor Bros. & Co. [192o, H. L.] -A. C. 144, 149, 156, 16o; Andersen, Meyer &
Co. v. Northwest Trading Co., supra note 8; Schopflocher v. Essgee Co. of China,
supra note 8.
"Price" and "payment" are used in this paper indiscriminately to cover cash
or acceptable exchange, or signing an acceptance, according as called for by the
contract.
'These arrangements, which correspond roughly to a seller's discount of draft
on his buyer with bill of lading attached, generally in international trade take the
form of. the buyer opening a credit with his bank in favor of the seller. Hence
so intimate a relation between buyer and banker in reference to the transaction
that it has been suggested (with questionable soundness) that payment against
non-conforming documents by the banker would operate as a waiver of defects
on behalf of the buyer. Anderson, Meyer & Co. v. Northwest Trading Co., supra
note 8. And that the underlying contract for sale might be used to construe the
banker's obligation to the seller-beneficiary. Arctic Ice & Coal Co. v. Southgate,
supra note 3. For the authorities holding the bank's obligation ta be independent
of the contract for sale, and for admirable discussion of the legal problems in
letters of credit, see McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit (1922) 35 HAv. L.
REV. 539, 715; see also Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security (1922) 22 CoL.
L. REv. 395, 546; Mead, op. cit. supra note IO.
'Kennedy, L. J., in Biddell Bros. v. Clemens Horst Co. [1911, C. A.] i K. B.
934, 952, approved s. c. supra note 5; see Harper v. Hochstim, supra note io;
Gillespie Bros. & Co. v. Thompson Bros. & Co. (1922, C. A.) 13 Ll. L. L. R.
519; Lucas, op. cit. supra note I, 56o et seq.
2'Lawder & Sons Co. v. Mackie Grocery Co. (19o3) 97 Md. I, 54 Atl. 634;
Craighill, op. cit. supra note i, at p. 230.
'SBiddell Bros. v. Clemens Horst Co., supra note 26.
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part of the burden of financing the transportation, but also a by no
means unimportant credit risk: that of trusting to the seller's good faith
that the goods are in fact as represented29 ; and of trusting to the seller's
fairness and continued solvency, in case a claim for refund or for
damages should prove necessary.
Here arise several questions. That the documents are fair on their
face is assumed in their discussion.
In the first place, suppose that before tender of the documents the
goods are, to the knowledge of the parties, either lost or damaged in
transit. It seems to be settled that this makes no difference; both risks
are on the buyer.30 At common law this seems to be fairly well settled. 1
The reasoning is that despite the seller's carrying the freight charge,
there is no point in insuring at the buyer's expense, as indicated in the
price quotation, unless such insurance is for the buyer's benefit, and so,
unless the buyer has an interest to insure. And where sec. 19 (5) of
the Sales Act is in force, it is held to have no application, because the
insurance clause in the contract makes "a contrary intent appear.
32
And printed clauses with reference to the risk are construed with con-
siderable rigor to keep them from altering the standard tenor of the
contract.3 3 Provisions, on the other hand, which read to place upon
the seller the contractual duty of delivering the goods at the point of
"Cf. Lucas, op. cit. supra, note I, at p. 556.
'Loss: Smith Co. v. Marano, supra note 13.; Smith Co. v. Moschalades, supra
note 13; Warner, Barnes & Co. v. Warner Sug. Refing. Co., supra note 13;
Groom, Ltd. v. Barber, supra note ii; Manbre Saccharine Co. v. Corn Products
Co., supra note xo (knowledge of loss at time of tender immaterial). Damage:
Mee v. McNider, supra note 7; Northern G. W. Co. v. Northwest Trading Co.,
supra note 8; and see U. S. v. Andrews (1907) 207 U. S. 229, 28 Sup. Ct. ioo,
same rule applied to a contract construed as c. and f. Contra, Lorimer v. Slade,
supra note 15, a c. i. f. e. contract, but the decision there seems to turn on the
seller being an importer doing business in the same market as the buyer.
' Cases cited under Damage, note 30; Williston, op. cit. supra note I, at p. 754;
cf. Setton v. Eberle Albrecht Flour Co. (I919, C. C. A. 8th) 258 Fed. 905.
'Cases cited under Loss, note 30; that the Sales Act left c. i. f. contracts "as
before": Smith Co. v. Moschalades, supra note 13; Harper v. Hochstim, supra
note io; but see Klipstein & Co. v. Dilsizian, supra note 13. Williston, loc. cit.
supra note 31, throws some question on the force of this reasoning, where the
insurance is not taken out in terms for the buyer's account. His argument is,
however, directed not at the rules putting risks and rights into the c. i. f. buyer
on shipment, but at those which deny like results in like cases where the full
c. i. f. fact-set is not present
"Printed clause: "In case . . . . the goods are damaged while in transit, the
buyer agrees to accept in settlement thereof the same percentage of allowance as
the seller 'may secure from the.insurers"; held to contemplate insurance by seller
as buyer's agent, or to be repugnant. Harper v. Hochstiin, supra note IO. "War
risk for buyer's account": held to mean that war risk is exclusively buyer's con-
cern, altogether apart from the regular insurance called for by the c. i. f. terms.
Groom, Ltd. v. Barber, supra note ii. Printed clause: "Goods at seller's risk till
actual delivery": held repugnant. Law & Bonar, Ltd. v. Br.-Ain. Tobacco Co.,
supra note 17.
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destination, show some tendency to be construed as affecting the whole
character of the contract 3 4
It has seemed to the writer, however, that the compass-needle of
presumed intention-unless that canon means nothing more than what-
ever on the best evidence obtainable after real search, seems to be busi-
ness sense in the circumstances-suffers arbitrary and unchartable
declination in navigating these waters. In the last case put, for instance,
there are, if one is attempting to determine the whereabouts of title,
two obviously contradictory factors: the insurance premium included
in the price, and the apparent undertaking of the seller to deliver at
destination. Commercial practice and understanding, where it can be
discovered, is the only safe guide between the whirlpool and the reef.
The English Court of Appeals, in Scott v. Barclay's Bank,35 recently
declined to pass on a number of points fairly involved in the case and
earnestly argued before them, because those points were of far-reaching
import, and there were "a number of classes of commercial men from
whom they had heard no evidence on the subject." Such judicial policy
did not cease to be wisdom when Lord Mansfield left the bench. It
may fairly be asked, for instance, whether the language, "net landed
weight," in a c. i. f. contract is commercially understood to mean any-
"Net landed weight" construed to mean that weight at the point of landing
must accord with the contract, and suit to recover back part of price proportionate
to shortage allowed. Willits & Patterson v. Abekobei & Co., supra note 21, a
case unobjectionable in result, although not uniformly happy in the implications
of the opinion. "Landed weights," "delivery to be tendered ex vessel," sellers to
draw for not exceeding go per cent of invoice, full shipping documents, including
policy of insurance, attached: the express provision for delivery of the policy
[though surely that provision is inherent in c. i. f. terms] held to throw risk of
total loss on buyer, but final determination of price in case of arrival to be by
weights as landed, subject to any showing of partial loss during voyage; it was
stated, unnecessarily, that title and risk intended to pass on presentment of docu-
ments; after total loss, seller's suit for unpaid price was allowed. Warner,
Barnes & Co. v. Warner Sugar Refing. Co., supra note 13. "New York official
landed weights": construed to require delivery on vessel in an American port, to
be simultaneous with payment, title to remain in seller until delivery; subject to
buyer's election, apparently, to tender payment and demand delivery of documents;
this construction was perhaps influenced by the court's reading the Sales Act to
mean that "title" is retained till delivery, the bills of lading being to seller's order.
Suit for non-acceptance allowed against buyer. Klipstehi & Co. v. Dilsizian, supra
note 13; see also note 32. "Payment io days after delivery when passed by the
Department of Agriculture": construed to retain title in seller until delivery at
destination, meaning, apparently, delivery of the goods; and to make tender of
an insurance policy unnecessary to sustain an action for non-acceptance, since
buyer had no interest in the insurance. George Carocopos, Inc. v. James Chieves
& Co., supra note 8; why insurance should be at buyer's expense under this
holding remains a mystery; contra in substance and decidedly sounder in con-
struction is Orient Co., Ltd. v. Brekke & Howlid, supra note IO, where a clause
as to payment thirty days after delivery was not permitted to affect the standard
c. i. f. character of the contract.
"Supra note io.
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thing more than that the price paid is subject to adjustment according
to the weight as landed-even, perhaps, with leave in the seller to show
any shortage to be due to perils of the voyage-in the same fashion that
the quality of the merchandise is subject to inspection and test at the
time of physical delivery3 ---with no reference whatever to the balance
of the incidents to the standard contract. Leakage is one thing,
deterioration in transit is another, damage by sea water still another, and
total loss yet a fourth. And it seems open to serious question whether
sound construction of variations in standard contracts lies in the direc-
tion of presuming from minor single clauses to find intention as to when
title should pass-with all that that implies.87
K. N. L.
THE USE OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES IN THE
DETERMINATION OF A FELONY
It is a settled rule that state legislatures may delegate to municipal-
ities the power to make their own rules and regulations.1  Consequently
local laws and ordinances have the force of authority, and society will
punish a failure to abide by their terms. "An ordinance, like a
statute, is a law within its sphere of operation."2  When, however,
an attempt is made to take the ordinance out of its local setting and
make it susceptible of wider application, difficult questions arise. For
example, a defendant is prosecuted fof involuntary manslaughter. It
is incumbent upon the state to prove as an element of that offense that
the killing occurred while the slayer was in the commission of an
unlawful act.3 The law claimed to have been violated is a criminal
statute which prohibits driving a motor vehicle "at a speed greater
than is reasonable or proper, having regard to the width, traffic, use
and general and usual rules of the road." 4  In determining whether
this law has been transgressed, it is necessary to have before the court
Compare the rule of Warner, Barnes & Co. v. Warner Sugar Refining Co.,
and that of George Carocopos, Inc. v. James Chieves & Co., given in note 34.
' The question of suit for the price on non-acceptance and the other topics
mentioned in the text will be discussed in a later paper.
'Brodbine v. Inthabitants of Revere (19o3) 182 Mass. 598, 66 N. E. 6o7; Louden
v. Starr (1915) 171 Iowa, 528, 154 N. W. 331; see COMMENTS (1921) 31 YAtE
LAW JOURNAL, 183; (1922) 32 ibid. 19o.
'Martin v. Herzog (192o) 228 N. Y. 164, 169, 126 N. E. 814, 815.
'Wharton, Homicide (3d ed. 1907) secs. 210-213.
' In one jurisdiction such a statute has been held void for uncertainty. Hayes
v. State (1912) 11 Ga. App. 371, 75 S. E. 523. But such statutes are generally
sustained. State v. Schaeffer (1917) 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N. E. =o; State v.
Goldstone (1920) 144 Minn. 405, 175 N. W. 892; Huddy, Automobiles (6th ed.
1922) sec. 744; see Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes (1921) 30
YALE LA w JOuRNAL, 437, 44,3; (923) 32 ibid. 29i. In Ohio all crimes are
statutory, so that negligent homicide is not a crime unless it is in the commission
of an act prohibited by law. Johnson v. State (1902) 66 Ohio St. 59, 63 N. E. 607.
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the "rules of the road." The state then seeks to supply this necessary
element of the unlawful killing by the introduction of a municipal
ordinance, and by proof that he was at the time acting in violation of
that ordinance. In a recent case, State v. O'Mara (1922) 105 Ohio
St. 94, 136 N. E. 885, the court held, three judges dissenting, that
this evidence was admissible.
The problem presented to the court involved an interesting question
of statutory interpretation. The statute by its terms contemplates an
inquiry into some definite rules of action binding upon all within their
sphere of operation. ,Any regulations of conduct recognized by the
community as such, whether they take the form of custom leading to
actions of definite character, or of express agreement by the inhabit-
ants to act in a particular manner, or of legislative enactment, may
properly be said to be the "general and usual rules of the road." But
a municipal ordinance is undoubtedly "the rule of the road" in that
it prescribes definite rules of conduct binding, upon all who make use
of the streets of the jurisdiction. In order to establish a violation of
the statute, it is necessary to determine whether the defendant's conduct
was unreasonable having regard to those established rules. The ques-
tion then arises as to the weight to be attached to a violation of a "rule
of the road." Is it conclusive proof that the defendant's conduct was
unreasonable, or is it merely a circumstance to be weighed with others?
A similar question has troubled the courts in the field of torts, in
considering the effect of a breach of an ordinance on the question of
negligence in determining civil liability.5 Many courts say it is only
evidence of negligence.6 This rests on the basis that an ordinance
is not sufficient to create a duty between citizen and citizen; but it
does express the municipal opinion as to what is proper conduct. The
existence of a legislative enactment is a circumstance to be considered
by every prudent driver in regulating his conduct in that community.
It may in fact not have been negligence to violate the ordinance in this
'See Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action (1914) 27 HARV. L. REv. 317;
Malburn, Violation of Laws Limiting Speed as Negligence (1911) 45 Am . L. Rnv.
2 4; Huddy, op. cit. supra note 4, secs. 320-322; (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 91.
'Stevens v. Luther (1920) io5 Neb. 184, 18o N. W. 87; Southern Ry. v. Stock-
don (19o7) io6 Va. 693, 56 S. E. 713. Some few cases consider the breach of
an ordinance prima facie evidence of negligence-that is, there is a compelled
inference of negligence in the absence of evidence to explain the violation.
Riley v. Rapid Transit Co. (1894) IO Utah, 428, 37 Pac. 681; Oates v. Union Ry.
(19o6) 27 R. I. 499, 63 Atl. 675. The effect of this view is to shift the burden
of going forward; but the weight attached to it is merely weight as evidence,
and it is still open to inquire into other circumstances to determine whether the
defendant's conduct was in fact unreasonable. See Oates v. Union Ry. supra.
The ultimate burden of proving negligence in fact is still on the party alleging
it. See People v. Lloyd (1913) 178 Ill. App. 66, 70. In Kentucky, the ordinance
is entirely disregarded on the ground that a breach thereof no more tends to
show negligence than a compliance with its terms tends to show due care. Ford's
Adm'r. v. Paducah Ry. (1o7) 124 Ky. 488, 99 S. W. 355.
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particular instance, but it is an element in the situation to be considered
with all the other surrounding circumstances. This same reasoning
may be applied in considering the criminal statute; and the violation
of the ordinance, or "rule of the road," would be only some evidence
that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable. The probative 'value
of the fact that such an ordinance existed remains the same whether
we are considering negligence in cases of civil liability or negligence
made criminal by statute. In the latter case, however, the situation is
somewhat complicated by the fact that a violation of the statute may,
as in the instant case, be a stepping stone to a conviction for man-
slaughter. But from this view, the ordinance has only an evidential
bearing on the ultimate definition of the crime of manslaughter; it
is not even conclusive evidence of a violation of the statute.7  Its
weight as evidence is great or small according to the actual conditions
prevailing at the time. Giving such effect to the "rule of the road"
is not unreasonable.
The breach of an ordinance, however is often considered as negli-
gence per se s for a violation of law cannot be considered as prudent
conduct. When the community has declared certain conduct so dan-
gerous as to prohibit it by positive enactment, the question of neg-
ligence is no longer for the jury; the defendant cannot set up another
standard of care against that of the community. Applying this rea-
soning to the criminal case, a violation of the ordinance is conclusive
of a violation of the statute, and this is sufficient to make a homicide
'If the ordinance is considered only as evidence, its relation to the ultimate
crime charged is not one of direct definition. Its value as evidence is no greater
than that of any other common standard of conduct. So in an action for negli-
gence against a drover or warehouseman, it is helpful to know the degree of care
customarily adopted by others of the same class under the same circumstances.
Cass v. Boston. & Lowell Ry. (1867) 96 Mass. 448; Maynard v. Buck (1868)
ioo Mass. 40. Their standard may be particularly high or unduly lax; but it
does aid the jury in fixing the proper standard for the particular case. The
practice, however uniform, does not constitute a rule of conduct by which the
jury is to be controlled. Considering the ordinance as such a standard adopted
by the community, and a violation as merely one of the circumstances surround-
ing the defendant's act, it would not raise the constitutional problem presented
in the instant case. For the effect of the ordinance merely as evidence, see
Yarbrough v. Carter (1913) 179 Ala. 356, 6o So. 833, where, in a suit for wilful
and wanton injury, the ordinance was allowed as one fact to be considered with
others, though a breach of it is considered only as simple negligence, and though
there was no count claiming damages for its violation. On the question of
unreasonable speed, certain types of ordinances are useful only as evidence.
Thus the breach of an ordinance requiring vehicles to pass street cars on the
left, or to drive on the right hand side of the road, could be no more than
evidence of prevailing conditions, and the fact that such an ordinance was
disobeyed is only one accompanying circumstance.
'Riser v. Smith (1917) 136 Minn. 417, 162 N. W. 520; Weimer v. Rosen (1919)
ioo Ohio St. 361, 126 N. E. 3o7; Whaley v. Ostendorff (1911) 90 S. C. 281, 73
S. E. 186; Memphis Ry. v. Haynes (19o4) 112 Tenn. 712, 8I S. W. 374; Ander-
son v. Kinnear (1914) So Wash. 638, 141 Pac. 1151.
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manslaughter. A case may arise where it may be said that but for
the existence of the ordinance the unintentional killing would not con-
stitute manslaughterP Clearly the municipality then defines an essen-
tial element of the crime of manslaughter.'0 Hence the objection of
the minority in the instant case is that it amounts to an unconstitutional
delegation to the municipality of the legislative power to define a felony.
It must be conceded that by such a construction of the statute the
legislature adopted as a part of the definition of the crime, not only exist-
ing ordinances within the limits of a municipality, but also future ordi-
nances within the same limits. It is then within the power of the muni-
cipality by passing ordinances at its discretion in effect to prescribe
what conduct shall make a homicide manslaughter. ' Is such a delega-
tion unconstitutional?
The doctrine of the separation of powers, with the legislative author-
ity vested solely in a general assembly, arose as a political theory and
not as a scheme of government perfected by experience.:" But the
increasing diversity of industir and interests generally calls for knowl-
edge exceeding the capacity of legislators. Consequently courts have
permitted general legislation with the details to be determined by some
delegated body, though intimating that such a delegation is not a strict
compliance with the fundamental constitutional principle.' 2  It is now
recognized that the substance of legislative power is at bottom the
choosing and the adoption of a broad rule of policy. This is the
power that may not be delegated; but the determination of the details
necessary for the application of such a general enactment may be
Such is assumed to be the fact in the dissenting opinion of the instant case.
10A similar situation may arise when a state law makes criminal the driving
over a certain speed in "closely knit" or "congested" districts of a community,
and a municipal ordinance defines what sections are "closely knit" or "congested."
To advert to such an ordinance as a completion of the state law is to permit the
municipality by characterizing certain localities in this way in effect to prescribe
that speed over that particular rate in the specified portions is criminal within
the meaning of the statute. The ordinance would be conclusive. Cf. State v.
Born (1912) 85 Ohio St. 430, 98 N. E. io8, overruled by the instant case; Weinter
v. Rosens, supra note 8.
' "The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject [the separation
of powers] is the celebrated Montesquieu ...... The British constitution was to
Montesquieu what Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry .....
On the slightest view of the British Constitution we must perceive that the
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate
and distinct from each other ...... In no instance has a competent provision
been made for maintaining in practice the separation delineated on paper."
James Madison, Federalist, No. 47.
"It would not be possible without the introduction of a commission or other
agency, for it to properly exercise the power of regulating rates conferred on
it by the state Constitution. It is true that the function of fixing rates is legisla-
tive in its nature, yet it seems well settled now that the creation of a commission,
with power to fix rates, is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power."
Ry. Commission v. Central Ry. (igog, C. C. A. 5th) 17o Fed. 225, 238.
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delegated even though it involves some discretion and control.:3 So,
in the instant case, the legislature has manifested its intent to prohibit
unreasonable speed and to punish homicide caused thereby. The adap-
tation of the offense to any specific locality may well be delegated in
express terms to the legislative body of the city to be determined in
accordance with local conditions. In effect, the result of an express
delegation is accomplished when existing ordinances are embodied into
the state law; but it is still the state law, and not the ordinance per se,
that is the basis for the charge of manslaughter.: 4 Such effect to the
"rule of the road" offers little objection on constitutional grounds.
When it becomes a matter of severe criminal punishment, however,
it is doubtful whether any a priori test as to what conduct shall always
constitute negligence ought to be established. It is when one is
brought into actual physical relations with another that a duty to use
"care arises. In the field of torts the severity of an absolute standard
is somewhat mitigated by the doctrine of contributory negligence.
This doctrine has no application in the field of criminal law.' 5 Does
it not impose too severe a penalty for the breach of an ordinance to
allow it to determine whether a homicide is manslaughter? The
instant case is, however, an illustration of .the far-reaching conse-
quences that may follow the breach of a municipal ordinance.
" Thus the Secretary of Agriculture may be empowered to make rules and
regulations for the conservation of forest lands after-the legislature has decided
upon a conservation policy. United States v. Grimand (191o) 220 U. S. 5o6,
31 Sup. Ct. 480. So too a delegation to a commission to fix reasonable rates or
make proper rules is not unconstitutional. State v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. (,9,5)
76 W. Va. 399, 85 S. E. 714; State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. (1908) 56 Fla.
617, 47 So. 969; Buttfield v. Stranahan (1904) 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349.
Nor to a board of health to make reasonable regulations. Blue v. Beach (19oo)
155 Ind. 121, 56 N. E. 89. Legislation made to depend for its operation upon
a vote of the people of the community is not vulnerable on constitutional grounds.
Eckerson v. Des Moines (i9o8) 137 Iowa, 452, 115 N. W. 177. And it has been
the marked tendency in recent years "to break away from the theory of three
separate and independent departments of government by imposing upon other
departments duties and powers of a legislative character which the courts have
been inclined to sustain." Cook v. Burnquist (1917, C. C. A. 3d) 242 Fed. 321,
325; see Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions (918) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 892.
' It is of interest to note that by the decisions of the Ohio court, the crime
of manslaughter cannot be predicated solely on the breach of an ordinance, but
it may be predicated on the breach of the statute in the absence of an ordinance.
State v. Collingsworth (igo) 82 Ohio St. 154, 92 N. E. 22; State v. Schaeffer,
supra note 4. Hence the ordinance is utterly dependent upon the state law, and
only supplies necessary details for defining the primary unlawful act.
" The state is required to prove the consequences of the unlawful act and not
that the deceased used due care to avoid them. Schultz v. State (1911) 89 Neb.
34, 13o N. W. 972; Lauterbach v. State (1915) 132 Tenn. 603, 179 S. W. 130.
So it is held immaterial that the deceased ran in front of the automobile. Lauter-
bach v. State, supra; but see People v. Barnes (914) 182 Mich. 179, 148 N. W.
400, where it was held that the contributory negligence of the deceased had a
bearing only on the question of the "gross" negligence of the defendant.
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THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE TUCKER ACT
Because of governmental immunity from suit, prior to the legislation
establishing the Court of Claims, there existed no legal machinery to
compel payment by the government, where private property had been
taken and applied to a public use.' This legislation, now embodied in
the Tucker Act of 1887, renders the United States liable, among other
things, for "claims arising upon contract, express or implied, or for
damages in cases not sounding in tort."2
In the sense of an unfettered meeting of the minds, it is obvious that
a bare appropriation of private property for public use raises no con-
tractual relation between the government and the property owner. But
because of the power of the government to take such property by
eminent domain and because of the constitutional prohibition against so
doing without making adequate compensation, the courts imply an agree-
ment to make such payment from the act of taking. Since the power
of eminent domain operates without regard to the consent of- the prop-
erty owner, such consent is quite unnecessary, but by fiction is said to be
implied.4 Thus the contractual basis for suits under the Tucker Act
is found and relief is granted thereunder for public appropriations
of private property.5 This general rule is qualified only to the extent
'Officers attempting to appropriate private property could, at the outset, be
enjoined from so doing until compensation had been made. See United States v.
Great Falls Mfg. Co. (1884) i12 U. S. 645, 5 Sup. Ct. 3o6. But, until this legis-
lation, the property owner was dependent for relief upon the grace of Congress,
where his property had once been applied to the public use. Freund, Private
Claims Against the State (1893) 8 POL. ScI. QuART. 625.
'Act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 505); U. S. Comp. Sts. (1916) secs.
991 (26), 1136 (I).
'United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., supra note i; United States v. Lynrh
(19o3) 188 U. S. 445, 23 Sup. Ct. 349; Marion County v. United States
(9,8, U. S.) 53 Ct Cl. 12o. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States prohibits the taking of property for public use without just com-
pensation. It is a limitation upon the powers of the federal government only.
Barron v. Baltimore .(1833, U. S.) 7 Pet. 243. The several states are similarly
affected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and by their own constitutions. These
latter occasionally require compensation for property "injured" or "damaged" as
well as "taken."
'It seems that the actual consent of the owner is wholly immaterial, and that
he can not defeat his right to compensation by an affirmative failure to consent.
The contract will be implied notwithstanding. See opinion of Mr. Justice Brown,
United States v. Lyntah, supra note 3; Roberts v. Northern Pacific Ry. (1894)
158 U. S. i, 15 Sup. Ct 756. Only in the patent cases is there an intimation that
the consent of the patent owner may be material to the implication of a contract.
See Schillinger v. United States (1894) 155 U. S. 163, 15 Sup. Ct 85; United
States v. Palmer (1888) 128 U. S. 262, 9 Sup. Ct. 1O4; Crozier v. Krupp (i911)
224 U. S. 290, 32 Sup. Ct. 488. However, the question is no longer of importance
in patent cases since the Act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 85I), which renders
the contractual implication unnecessary for a recovery for an infringement by the
United States.
It is interesting to note in this connection that the clause of the Tucker Act
giving relief for claims arising "upon the constitution," instead of the contractual
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that an affirmative intention not to pay on the part of the government
is considered as defeating the implication of contract.6 In such cases
the taking is held to be tortious merely, for which the government is no
more liable than for any other tortY
The courts, having broadened the Fifth Amendment by the implica-
tion of a contract, have found their greatest difficulty in ascertaining
under what circumstances and in regard to what injuries to property the
Amendment is operative. Riparian rights, easements, and the various
other intangible rights of user attaching to real estate are as much prop-
erty as the real estate itself.8 Logically, it seems that any injury to the
clause, very nearly became the basis for the relief granted under the Fifth Amend-
ment Had that view prevailed, there would have been no ground for the "claim
of right" distinction. See infra note 6; the dissenting opinion, Hill v. United
States (1893) 149 U. S. 593, 13 Sup. Ct. IOli; the concurring opinions, United
States v. Lynah, supra note 3.
'An affirmative intention on the part of the government not to make compensa-
tion will defeat the contractual implication and any recovery based thereon. The
usual case illustrative of this point is where the government claims title to the
property taken under a mistaken "claim of rigAt" Tempel v. United States (1918)
248 U. S. 121, 39 Sup. Ct. 56; Hill v. United States, supra note 5; Langford v.
United States (1879) 101 U. S. 341; Fawcett v. United States (i89o, U. S.) 25
Ct. Cl. 178; Castelo v. United States (1916, U. S.) 5, Ct. Cl. 221; Hijo v. United
States (1904) 194 U. S. 315, 24 Sup. Ct 727; Juragua Iron Co. v. United States
(19o9) 212 U. S. 297, 29 Sup. Ct. 385; (1919) 29 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 125.
Patent cases: Bliss v. United States (1917, U. S.) 53 Ct. Cl. 47; Haupt v. United
States (1918, U. S.) 53 Ct. Cl. 591; Farnham v. United States (1916) 240 U. S.
537, 36 Sup. Ct 427; Russell v. United States (igol) 182 U. S. 516, 21 Sup.
Ct. 899.
Even if the government recognizes the claimant's title, it seems that there will
be no recovery if there was a deliberate intent to take without payment. See
Harley v. United States (1905) 198 U. S. 229, 25 Sup. Ct. 634; Ball Engineering
Co. v. White & Co. (1918) 250 U. S. 46, 39 Sup. Ct. 393; Curved Electrotype
Plate Co. v. United States (1915, U. S.) 50 Ct. Cl. 258. But such intent to do a
wrongful act will not be imputed to the government in the absence of the most
convincing proof. United States v. Socit6, etc. (1912) 224 U. S. 309, 32 Sup. Ct.
479. In this class of cases, it seems that the greater and more deliberate the
injury, the weaker the remedy.
7 The Tucker Act expressly precludes recovery against the government for
injuries "sounding in tort." Supra note 2. Consequently, the United States can
not be made liable for the tortious or unauthorized acts of its officers. Bigby v.
United States (1903) 188 U. S. 400, 23 Sup. Ct. 468; Pendleton v. United States
(1921, U. S.) 56 Ct. Cl. 222; Journal & Tribune Co. v. United States (1921) 254
U. S. 581, 41 Sup. Ct 202; Basso v. United States (1916) 239 U. S. 602, 36 Sup.
Ct. 226. It is interesting to note that the statutory phrase "not sounding in tort"
is taken to defeat recovery in those actions when, between private parties, the
tort could be waived and an implied contract set up. McArthur v. United States
(1894, U. S.) 29 Ct. Cl. 191; Mann v. United States (1897, U. S.) 32 Ct. Cl.
58o. The legislation existing before the Tucker Act (1887) did not contain this
phrase, and evidently at that time such waivers were permissible. See United
States v. Rusisell (1871, U. S.) 13 Wall. 623; MaJson v. United States (I878,
U. S.) 14 Ct. Cl. 59. Cf. McArthur v. United States, supra.
8 Eaton v. B. C. & M. Ry. (1872) 5I N. H. 504. See Marion County v. United
States, supra note 3. In the following cases a "taking" was found: Pumpelly
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use or value of tangible property is as much a taking of property as the
complete deprivation or destruction of such use when the owner is
ousted from possession, and should consequently be protected under the
constitution." But only in a measure has this proposition been accepted.
No principle of our law is better settled than that a great many injuries
to property are not included in the meaning of the constitutional "taking"
and that consequently their infliction is tortious and not contractual.10
v. Green Bay Co. (1871, U. S.) 13 Wall. 166 (land); United States v. Cress
(1917) 243 U. S. 316, 37 Sup. Ct. 380 (fall necessary to operate a mill);
United States v. Welch (igio) 217 U. S. 333, 30 Sup. Ct. 527 (easement); Ports-
mouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States (1922, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct 135
(servitude) ; United States v. Lynah, supra note 3 (utility of land destroyed) ;
Forbes v. United States (1917, U. S.) 52 Ct. C1. 6o (water right) ; Monk v.
United States (1921, U. S.) 56 Ct. Cl. 429 (riparian rights) ; Chappell v. United
States (1888, C. C. D. Md.) 34 Fed. 673 (servitude) ; Heyward v. United States
(1911, U. S.) 46 Ct Cl. 484; on rehearing (1917) 52 ibid. 87 (drainage destroyed).
'See the opinion of Mr. Justice Shiras, dissenting, Scrantot v. Wheeler (igoo)
179 U. S. 141, 21 Sup. Ct. 48. Cf. Shively v. Bowlby (1893) 152 U. S. 1, 14 Sup.
Ct. 548.
Compare the cases, of which United States v. Grizzard (1911) 219 U. S. 18o,
31 Sup. Ct. 162, is the leading example, holding that "wherever there has been an
actual physical taking of a part of a distinct tract of land, the compensation to be
awarded includes not only the market value of that part of the tract appropriated,
but the damage to the remainder resulting from the taking." Logically there seems
to be no ground for a distinction based upon ownership. See also Sharp v. United
States (19o3) 19, U. S. 341, 24 Sup. Ct 114. But if this proposition is to be
maintained, it follows that benefits to the remainder due to the taking may be
set-off to reduce compensation. Bauman v. Ross (1897) 167 U. S. 548, 17 Sup.
Ct. 966. See McCoy v. Union Elevated Ry. (1917) 247 U. S. 354, 38 Sup.
Ct 504-
1
'Marion County v. United States, supra note 3 (intermittent flooding of land);
Jackson v. United States (1913) 230 U. S. I, 33 Sup. Ct IOl1 (same) ; Archer v.
United States (9,8, U. S.) 53 Ct Cl. 405 (same); Sanguinetti v. United States
(1920) 55 Ct Cl. 107 (same); Hughes v. United States (1913) 230 U. S. 24, 33
Sup. Ct ioig (same); Cubbins v. Mississsippi River Commission (1916) 241
U. S. 351, 36 Sup. Ct 671 (same); Manigault v. Springs (19o5) 199 U. S. 473,
26 Sup. Ct 127 (same, also impairment of drainage); Mills v. United States
(18gi, S. D. Ga.) 46 Fed. 738 (impairment of drainage); Natron Soda Co. v.
United States (1919, U. S.) 54 Ct. Cl. 169 (seepage and percolation caused by
government irrigation scheme) ; Scranton v. Wheeler, supra note 9 (interruption
of riparian access) ; Gibson v. United States (1897) 166 U. S. 269, 17 Sup. Ct
578 (same) ; Transportation Co. v. Chicago (1878) 99 U. S. 635 (same) ; Peabody
v. United States (1911, U. S.) 46 Ct Cl. 39 (occasional firing of coast defense
guns over land); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States (1918,
U. S.) 53 Ct Cl. 210 (same) ; Bedford v. United States (1904) 192 U. S. 217, 24
Sup. Ct 238 (revetment causing continued erosion); Hayward v. United States
(1895, U. S.) 30 Ct Cf. 219 (soil carried away by washout caused by government
dam); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co. (1913) 229 U. S. 53, 33 Sup. Ct
667 (deprivation of use of water power) ; Willink v. United States (I916) 24o
U. S. 572, 36 Sup. Ct 422 (extension of harbor line across plaintiff's land);
Bothwell v. United States (192o) 254 U. S. 231, 41 Sup. Ct 74 (flooding caused
loss of stock on forced sale) ; Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons (1843, Pa.)
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The cases give little help in arriving at the basic criteria upon which the
distinction rests. In their results there is the widest conflict""; it is
only apparent that there is no particular kind of property singled out
for protection.' 2 Their language may be summarized in the following
often-cited quotation from Transportation Co. v. Chicago'3 : "Acts done
in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not directly.
encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may
impair its use, are universally held not to be a taking within the meaning
of the constitutional provision." It is obvious that to state this criterion
in conjunction with any concrete set of facts is to raise at once the
question, "W-hen is an act a direct encroach-ment,-and when merely con-
sequential?" In determining the unexpressed major premise upon
which the cases are really decided, the results of the cases themselves
can be the only guide.
Turning now to the cases, a few broad tendencies are to be noticed.'
4
It may be stated that where private property is itself specifically devoted
to an active public use, a taking is generally found, while the opposite
is the case where the use of government property entails mere nuisance
6 Watts & S. ioi (destruction of fall necessary to operate mill). See also the
following patent cases: Crozier v. Krupp, supra note 4; Schillinger v. United
States, supra note 4; United States v. Pahner, supra note 4; Curved Electrotype
Co. v. United States, supra note 6; Russell v. United States, supra note 6.
1 Many instances of apparent conflict in the results of the cases may be cited.
Perhaps one of the most striking is that illustrated by United States v. Cress,
supra note 8, in which the use of a mill was held to have been taken by the
destruction of the fall necessary for its operation caused by the construction of
government dams. The case of Monongahela Nay. Co. v. Coons, supra note io,
decided in the Pennsylvania court under a similar provision of the Pennsylvania
construction, is squarely in conflict. It seems that there should be no essential
difference upon theory between the Cress case and the Gibson, Scranton, Bedford,
and Jackson cases, supra note io, in each of which a similar rise in water level
prevented some riparian use of the claimant's land, or did some other injury. In
its opinion in the Cress case, the court makes no attempt to distinguish them upon
theory, but without explanation brushes them aside upon the facts. For further
illustration, compare the cases cited in note IO with those cited in note 8 and the
following: Morris v. United States (1895, U. S.) 30 Ct Cl. 162 (erection of
dam on plaintiff's land); United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., supra note i
(same) ; Archer v. United States, supra note io (same) ; Chapman v. United States
(1918, U. S.) 53 Ct Cl. 203 (intermittent flooding) ; King v. United States (1893,
C. C. D. S. C.) 59 Fed. 9 (flooding); Williams v. United States (igoo,
C. C. D. S. C.) 104 Fed. 50 (same); United States v. Grizzard, supra note 9.
See also the following patent cases: Bethlehem Steel Co. v. United States (1918)
53 Ct Cl. 348; United States v. Societi, etc., supra note 6; United States v.
Berdan Fire Arms Co. (895) 156 U. S. 552, 15 Sup. Ct. 42o; Hollister v. Bene-
dict Co. (1885) 113 U. S. 59, 5 Sup. Ct 717; Cramp v. Curtis Turbine Co. (1918)
246 U. S. 28, 38 Sup. Ct. 271. In these cases a taking was found.
"See cases cited supra note 8.
"Supra note IO.
'
4 The conclusions stated in this paragraph have been evolved from the considera-
tion of a number of cases, and are not to be found stated in the opinions as rules
of law. For verification, compare the cases cited, supra notes 8, IO, and ii.
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or inconvenience to adjoining property owners. The line, then, is to
be drawn somewhere between these two extremes. While, as stated
above, no distinction is made as to the kind of property which may be
the subject of a taking, the courts seem much more ready to grant relief
when a claimant has been ousted from the possession of tangible prop-
erty than when he has suffered the deprivation of some intangible right,
such as an easement.15 Also, a taking is apparently much easier to find
when some benefit therefrom accrues to the government than where the
act complained of results in a bare injury or destruction of property.16
With these tendencies of the cases in mind, the following quotations
of judicial language seem highly significant, In Scranton v. Wheeler'1
the Supreme Court says: "It was not intended, by that provision in the
Constitution [Fifth Amendment], that the paramount authority of Con-
gress to improve navigation of the public waters should be crippled by
compelling the government to make compensation for an injury to the
riparian owner's right to access to navigability that might incidentally
result from an improvement ordered by Congress." The Pennsylvania
Court, interpreting a similar provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution,
has thus expressed itself :'s "The word 'taken' must be given its obvious
and popular meaning, so as to be restrained to property taken away, and
not extended to property injured by an act which did not amount to an
assumption of possession . . . A constitution is made not particu-
larly for the inspection of lawyers, but for the inspection of the plillion,
" It has often been stated that an actual physical ouster of possession is an
essential ingredient of a "taking." See Gibson v. United States, supra note io;
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, supra note io; Sanguinetti v. United States, supra
note io.
" The courts say that an injury inherently tortious cannot be turned into a
contract upon a quasi-contractual implication, because of the express prohibition
of the Tucker Act. See suepra note 7. Cf. New York, New Haven & Hartford
Ry. v. United States (1918, U. S.) 53 Ct. Cl. 222; Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v.
United States (192, U. S.) 56 Ct. Cl. 377, aft'd. (1922) Oct. Term, U. S. Sup. Ct.
No. 208. In these cases governmental liability in quasi-contract was denied under
the Tucker Act But a comparison of the results of the cases will show that the
judicial mind is much more impressed with a claim for an injury to private prop-
erty which has resulted in active governmental benefit than one which has not.
It is also interesting to note that occasionally it is said that if an act is
tortious as betveen private parties, it is tortious on the part of the government,
and no contractual inference is raised. "If what happened resulted in a damage
in the nature of a tort, such as against an individual or a private corporation would
necessarily have resulted in an action in tort, and did not, in fact, embody the
element of a taking under the Constitution, we have no jurisdiction." Keokuk &
Hamilton Bridge Co. v. United States (1920, U. S.) 55 Ct Cl. 480. See also
Langford v. United States, supra note 6; United States v. Palmer, supra. note 4.
Such language is obviously inaccurate when applied to this problem, since every
act of taking would, between private parties, sound in tort. But cf. Natron Soda
Co. v. United States, supra note io.
7 Supra note 9.
'Monongahela Co. v. Coons, supra note io.
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that they may read and discern in it their rights and duties; and it is
consequently expressed in the terms that are most familiar to them."
What, then, is the elusive, inarticulate major premise? It seems that
there exists in the judicial mind the conviction that the government
should not be unduly hindered in its great work of making improve-
ments for the public good.19 In this connection it is enlightening to
remember that at the common law existing before the adoption of the
Fifth Amendment the government was under no obligation to make
compensation for property devoted to public use, and that the doctrine
of governmental immunity from suit, based upon this same considera-
tion, was and is firmly entrenched in our law .2  And it is no doubt true
that if compensation were to be made for every comparatively trivial
and indirect damage or nuisance resulting from governmental activities,
those activities would be most seriously hampered. The public good
demands that such injuries be borne by the individuals upon whom they
happen to fall. On the other hand, policy as well as justice and the
Fifth Amendment all demand that direct and flagrant appropriations of
property be compensated and that the public should not force a few
individuals to bear the burden of public improvements. Added to these
conflicting considerations is the feeling that the constitutional "taking"
is not a word of art to be interpreted technically but, as the Pennsylvania
Court put it, to be restrained to its usual meaning of "property taken
away" by the government, and accruing to the public benefit.
It seems, then, that there is no definite major premise upon which the
cases are predicated. Rather the judicial state of mind is made up of
an appreciation of these conflicting considerations, which underlie the
conventional language of the opinions and may be traced in the tenden-
cies of the cases as above set forth. Rarely if ever expressed, this
appreciation is largely subconscious and operates more by instinct than
by reason. In place of a definite major premise, we must be content to
say that the question is one of degree,2 1 and that the line between the
"direct" and the "consequential" injuries of the decisions is drawn by
the application of the "rule of reason" so familiar in our constitutional
law.
When a man makes a note to a bank for the express purpose of puf-
fing its apparent assets to fool the examining authorities, he has no
call to complain when forced to make good his representation that the
transaction was genuine. The decision to that effect in Putiuam v.
' See also Union Bridge Co. v. United States (igo7) 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct.
367; Gibbons v. United States (1868, U. S.) 8 Wall. 269. Cf. Richards v. Wash-
ington Terminal Co. (1914) 233 U. S. 546, 34 Sup. Ct 654.
"o Freund, op. cit. supra note i.
" Occasionally this is intimated in the opinions, as in Hayward v. United States,
supra note io, where compensation was refused because "there was no appropria-
tion in any appreciable quantity."
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Chase' is sound and in line with authority. The novel feature in the
facts, not discussed in the opinion, is that during the pendency of the
action the plaintiff bank commissioner had sold the claim to a third
party, who was substituted as plaintiff. There seems to be no reason,
however, for not permitting such a transfer if it will facilitate liquida-
tion of an insolvent bank.
There is another type of irregularity in banking practice, however,
which results equally in the note-maker being forced to pay, and with
less reason. That is the phenomenon of repeatedly renewable paper.
Nelson v. Sapulpa State Bank2 illustrates again that the bank's oral
agreement to renew is no defense to suit on the note at maturity. As
a matter of negotiable instrument law the rule is unobjectionable. But
the situation which gives rise to such a case is decidedly objectionable.
If the banking laws which require extreme mobility of short-time
credit are sound, banks dealing in such credit have no business financ-
ing transactions which require, and are known in advance to require,
a longer term for actual re-payment; and paper agreed in advance to
be renewable is legal masquerade. If, on the other hand, the "inter-
mediate" credit period presents a legitimate banking field, we need
changes in both banking laws and banking organization.3
The usual charge to the jury in civil cases requires the party upon
whom rests the burden of proof to prove the issue by a preponderance
of the evidence. This orthodox charge does not raise the question
whether a mere preponderance that does not carry conviction is suffi-
cient. A recent decision' has reasserted the view that preponderance
in itself is sufficient. To require more "such as to convince the jury,
or to satisfy the jury," would be error, it was said. Contrary decisions
hold that a charge asserting that the jury must find according to the
preponderance is erroneous, "because preponderance may not convince
the minds of the jury."2  Certainly there is a distinction between pro-
ducing a preponderance of the evidence and sustaining the burden of
proof. If one party furnishes any material evidence and the other
none, the former has supplied not only the greater mass but also evi-
dence of greater convincing force, for manifestly any material evidence
is of greater convincing force than none. And yet it is too obvious for
comment that the party having the burden of proof upon an issue may
1 (1923, Or.) 212 Pac. 365. The opinion is clear and cogent. See also cases
there cited and discussion in (igig) 28 YALE LAW JoURixAL, 823.
3 (1923, Okla.) 212 Pac. 3o9. See also (1gig) 28 YALE LAW JouNAI., 823.
'The Agricultural Credits Act of March 4, 1923, goes some distance toward
curing this dilemma as to agricultural paper, but it does not touch the related
problem in commercial transactions.
Teter v. Spooner (1922, Ill.) 137 N. E. i29.
'Pulfman Palace Car Co. v. Adams (1898) 12o Ala. 581, 24 So. 921.
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put in much material evidence thereon and fail to get to the jury or fail
to get a verdict, even where his opponent has offered no evidence at all.
The distinction exists, but will an attempt to explain it to the jury really
clarify the matter or will it serve only to confuse or mislead the jury?
3
Since Haddock v. Haddock1 decided that "full faith and credit"
need not be given to ex parte foreign divorce decrees, New York has
led the way in discrediting them.2 The in rem theory of a divorce
action is thus subordinated to the in personam theory. Yet under
some circumstances such divorces have been held effective outside the
states which have granted them, notwithstanding that New York cit-
izens were involved.3 Two recent cases arising out of the same mat-
rimonial tangle bring out the 'inevitable difficulties inherent in the
illiberal doctrine. In Kelsey v. Kelsey (1922, App. Div.) 197 N. Y.
Supp. 371, a husband sued for divorce alleging adultery. His wife
had left him, obtained an ex parte divorce in Pennsylvania, and had
there married a New York citizen. Later they moved to New York.
Meanwhile the plaintiff had remarried. The divorce was denied him
on the ground of "estoppel." 4 The defendant's second "husband"
then died. She brought suit for the admeasurement of dower in his
New York lands, which was denied her on the ground that the Penn-
sylvania divorce was invalid. Bell v. Little (1922, App. Div.) 197
N. Y. Supp. 674. These decisions bring about the result that both
parties to the original marriage are guilty of adultery and deprive the
wife of the right to dower against either husband's estate. Such con-
sequences are surely unfortunate.
ERRATUM
Through error in assembling corrections in the galley-proof of the
April issue, a marginal query was inserted as part of the text. The
words, "inherited from her husband," in the first line of page 577 should
be deleted.
'See 5 Wigmore, Evidence (1905) sec. 2498, note I.
'(i9o6) 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct 525; COMMENTS (913) 23 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 88; (1917) 7 ibid. 117; (1919) 28 ibid. 821; (1922) 31 ibid. 548.
' Minor, Conflict of Laws (I9o) 204.
'Hubbard v. Hubbard (192o) 228 N. Y. 81, 126 N. E. 508; Ball v. Cross (1921)
231 N. Y. 329, 132 N. E. io6; COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 679.
"Starbuck v. Starbuck (19o3) 173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193.
